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Our national policy since 1954 has been to control the price of
natural gas at the wellhead.' The "in-line" price of the fifties was suc-
ceeded by the "guideline" price of the early sixties, 2 which was suc-
ceeded by batch rates set by producing areas in the late sixties, by
uniform national rates in the early seventies, and finally by statutory
rates in the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA).3 Not surpris-
* Member, Reynolds, Allen, Cook, Pannill & Hooper, Houston, Texas. B.A., Rice Univer-
sity; M.S., Columbia University; J.D., University of Texas. Editor-in-Chief, Volume 9, LITIOA-
TION, the Journal of the Section of Litigation of the American Bar Association.
1. Natural Gas Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-688, 52 Stat. 821 (codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-
717w) (1976).
2. See Public Service Comm'n v. FPC, 373 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1967). "The concept of an
in line price is an artificial one created by the Supreme Court, the Courts of Appeals, and the
Commission for the sole purpose of protecting the consumer." Id at 825. The procedure utilized
by the FPC to determine the in-line price in a particular case was outlined by the court:
First the Commission chooses a time period and a geographical area which it considers
relevant and lists all the prices at which gas was sold at that time and in that area. Then
it eliminates prices which are "suspect" either because they are presently under litigation
or Commission review or because they are similar to a price under a cloud. When the
price array is completed the FPC makes several calculations, for example, the average
price, the median price, the weighted average price, and the price at which substantial
volumes of gas flowed in interstate commerce. The FPC adjusts some of these prices by
assigning differing weights to the various prices which form the price array. At least one
Commissioner in our case gave some weight also to a guideline price announced first in
1960 and subsequently revised. The Commission considers these weights and the adjust-
ments, and then picks a price.
Id at 824 (footnotes omitted).
3. See generally Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing); Atlantic Ref'g Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959); Phillips Petroleum v.
Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954); Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Wiscon-
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ingly, talk of reform once again fills the air.
This article examines certain defects in the Natural Gas Policy Act
from the viewpoint that regulation of the price of natural gas has been
an unwise policy. Nevertheless, because even an unwise policy can be
carried out reasonably, this article criticizes and offers alternatives to
selected sections of the NGPA that need change.
II. THE POLICY BACKGROUND
The western world depends heavily on oil and natural gas for fuel.
Windmills and firewood have been proposed as energy substitutes, as
have coal, steam, synthetics, and nuclear power, but none have yet re-
placed oil and gas in availability and cost. Under these circumstances,
the purpose of legislation like the NGPA is to encourage production
within a sensible regulatory order.'
Congress imposed price ceilings on natural gas to ensure that the
consumers would not be burdened with inequitable fuel prices.' Be-
cause much natural gas is sold for home use, the issue of the price to be
charged by utility companies is politically sensitive. In this context,
legislative efforts to increase the supply of natural gas while maintain-
ing price controls meant that the Natural Gas Policy Act had to accom-
plish contradictory goals. The question for Congress, then, is whether
the contradictory goals of low domestic gas prices and deregulation can
ever be reconciled. 6 If not, price controls will only lead to natural gas
sin v. FPC, 201 F.2d 183 (D.C. Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 934 (1953); Natural Gas Policy
Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (Supp. III 1979) [hereinafter cited as NGPA].
4. See generally Note, Legislative History of the Natural Gas Policy Act: Title 1, 59 TEx. L.
REv. 101 (1980).
5. Id at 116. See also FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 610 (1944), discussing
the primary focus of the NGA "to protect consumers against exploitation at the hands of natural
gas companies."
6. These twin goals were reiterated in hearings before the Subcommittee on Energy and
Power of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on April 3, 1980. In opening
the hearings, Subcommittee Chairman Dingell stated:
Incremental pricing is one of the very important elements of the compromise that
was forged during the 95th Congress which resulted in the enactment of the Natural Gas
Policy Act of 1978 .... The act provides for the phased decontrol of wellhead prices of
natural gas .... [I]ncremental pricing was designed by Congress to restrain the prices
paid by pipelines for natural gas supplies, particularly after deregulation, and to protect
residential consumers from the higher prices resulting from deregulation. Again, I reit-
erate it was to be a market ordering mechanism.
H.R. Rep. No. 171, 96 Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) at 1. These hearings were held to consider FERC's
proposed "Phase II" rule regarding the incremental pricing of natural gas. The proposed rule was
rejected by resolution of the House of Representatives on May 6, 1980. H.R. REs. 655, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). This resolution prevented the proposed rule from taking effect. Had
FERC been allowed to implement its proposed rule, the incremental pricing regulations would
1981]
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shortages and to dependence, both politically and economically, on for-
eign supplies of fuel. If price controls erode economic efficiency and
political stability in this manner, it would be preferable to repeal them.
Effective reform of the NGPA must begin with a thorough reex-
amination of the erroneous assumptions that have accumulated for the
past twenty-five years. Since 1954, the Supreme Court, the Federal
Power Commission (FPC) and Congress have assumed that the produ-
cers' market for natural gas is not competitive, even though there is
little persuasive evidence of oligopoly among gas producers.7 This
faulty assumption is closely followed by the equally misleading as-
sumption that producers will collect a windfall if they are allowed to
charge prices that rise in response to pressure from the OPEC oil cartel.
But if price action can balance supply and demand, the concern about
inequity loses much of its force. An efficient and secure economy
serves the national interest more than an abstract concern about profits.
If the chance for profits leads to greater production, then the depen-
dence on overseas oil will diminish and fuel prices may even fall. The
falling prices for crude oil that followed deregulation in early 1981
show how deregulation might affect gas prices.
The real debate over natural gas pricing is an argument about eq-
uity. Advocates of price control believe it unfair for individuals to
profit from natural resources. In many nations, this perception has re-
sulted in common ownership of oil and gas.8 Being an argument over
values, the quarrel has not been economic, but political. Only land-
owners realize windfalls from random pools of oil and gas (or any
other minerals). Producers earn their sales price by searching for un-
known pools and producing them.
While Congress should begin with economics, it should also ex-
amine the statute9 produced by political compromise in 1978. In 1944,
the Supreme Court had construed the Natural Gas Act of 1938 as re-
quiring the FPC to set "just and reasonable rates" in the interstate gas
have been extended to include all industrial users except those specifically excluded by statute.
H.R. REP. No. 171 at 202.
7. Breyer & MacAvoy, The Natural Gas Shortage and the Regulation of Natural Gas Produ-
cers, 86 HARv. L. REv. 941 (1973).
8. One such nation is Mexico. The Constitution of the Mexican United States specifies:
"The direct dominium of all of the natural resources. . . , belong to the Nation." Miranda, The
Mining Law ofMexico, 14 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 277, 279 (1968).
9. Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 3301-3432) (Supp. III 1979).
[Vol. 17:54
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markets.' The 1978 law was a cross between a Senate bill" which
provided for deregulation of the interstate market and a House bill' 2
which provided for total regulation of all markets with prices tied to an
average cost of oil. Thus the final version was produced by a handful
of legislators in conference committee without hearings or similar pub-
lic scrutiny.' 3
This legislation left the Natural Gas Act standing but added a
complicated set of prices and regulatory provisions to govern future
sales. Perhaps the main virtue of the legislation is that it created such a
complex and diffuse system of regulation that the successor to the FPC,
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), has made little
effort to tinker with the pricing categories. Producer rates have become
largely a matter of definition. But many parts of this legislation must
be changed if the statute is to continue as the framework for producer
regulation.
III. PRICE REGULATION UNDER THE NATURAL GAS POLICY ACT
oF 1978
Price is the heart of producer regulation. As Mr. Justice Jackson
wrote in a famous opinion, "Farsighted gas-rate regulation . . . will
use price as a tool to bring goods to market-to obtain for the public
service the needed amount of gas."' 4 A price that brings the right
amount of goods to the market is a success, and any other price is a
failure. "If natural gas rates are intelligently to be regulated," Jackson
wrote, "we must fit our legal principles to the economy of the industry
and not try to fit the industry to our books."' 5 Congress ignored this
advice; the NGPA uses price as a tool for punishing some producers
and for classifying wells based on considerations unrelated to
production.
A. "Old" Gas
The NGPA builds a new price structure onto the complex ceilings
10. Phillips Petroleum v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
1. S. 2104, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
12. H.R. 8444, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) (proposed by the Administration).
13. See Note, Legislative History of the Natural Gas Policy Act: Title I, 59 TEx. L. REV. 101,
115 (1981).
14. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581, 612 (1945) (concurring opinion).
15. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 690 (1944).
1981]
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set by the Federal Power Commission under the Natural Gas Act. 16
Gas previously regulated under the principle of cost-of-service in the
Natural Gas Act has become known as "old gas."' 7 In general, section
104 permits "the just and reasonable rate" that would have been appli-
cable to the sale on April 20, 1977, and increases the price to adjust for
inflation in each succeeding month. t8
16. Natural Gas Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1976).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 3314 (Supp. III 1979). The term "old gas" was coined in the Permian Basin
Area Rate Cases, note 3 supra, to signify gas from wells already committed to interstate contracts
before the regulatory authority imposed new price incentives. The term has come to mean gas
discovered under an old pricing policy. See Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 491 F.2d 82, 86 (5th Cir. 1974).
18. (c) Inflation adustment. The inflation adjustment applicable to each month, begin-
ning with May 1977, and ending with the last month of the present quarter, is specified in
the following table:
Table Ill.-Inlation adjustment
Month of delivery Factor]
1977:











M arch ......................................................... 1.00597
April .......................................................... 1.00889




Septem ber .................................................... 1.00581
October ....................................................... 1.00581
November .................................................... 1.00581




M arch ......................................................... 1.00667
April .......................................................... 1.00667
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The term "old gas" is a misnomer. There is no such thing as "old"
gas, because gas cannot be stored, except in limited circumstances. Gas
is produced for immediate use and gas produced from a well drilled
yesterday has the same heating properties as that from a well drilled
fifty years ago and continuing to produce. In this sense, all gas is new
and of equal value.
What was originally meant by the term "old gas" was "gas from
old contracts." The FPC set lower rates for gas from old wells by look-
ing to average historical costs so that "excessive producer profits could
be minimized. . ... '9 The FPC assumed that the producer had spent
less to drill the old well so that the gas "cost" less. But this is merely an
assumption. It may cost as much to produce gas today or in the future
from old wells as new wells. Reworking an old well or adding com-
pression can drive the cost of old gas up sharply.2" What the regulators
had in mind was discovery cost, not production cost. Moreover, a pro-
ducer does not average his costs over time to decide whether his invest-
ment is profitable. He looks to future income. The FPC's assumption
made sense only if costs dropped after discovery. For those wells with
rising costs, FPC price policy actually discouraged this production.
In the Permian Basin Area Rate Cases,2' the Supreme Court ap-
proved an FPC decision to require differences in price for simultaneous




M arch ......................................................... 1.00713
April .......................................................... 1.00713











M arch ......................................................... 1.00904
April .......................................................... 1.00904
By which price in preceding month is multiplied.
18 C.F.R. § 271.102(c) (1981).
19. 390 U.S. 747, 802 (1968).
20. See, e.g., M. ADELMAN, THE WORLD PETROLEUM MARKET (1973).
21. 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
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average historical cost. . . would merely cause windfalls".22 Only Jus-
tice Douglas dissented, arguing that the FPC's methods were "apt to
take us with Alice into Wonderland."23 The rate structure sanctioned
by the Court vividly illustrates Justice Jackson's criticism of FPC meth-
ods in the Colorado Interstate case.
To let rate-base figures, compiled on any of the conventional
theories of rate-making, govern a rate for natural gas seems to
me little better than to draw figures out of a hat. These cases
confirm and strengthen me in the view I stated in the Hope
case that the entire rate-base method should be rejected in
pricing natural gas, though it might be used to determine
transportation costs. These cases vividly demonstrate the de-
lirious results produced by the rate-base method. These or-
ders in some instances result in three different prices for gas
from the same well. The regulated company is a part owner,
an unregulated company is a part owner, and the land owner
has a royalty share of the production from certain wells. The
regulated company buys all of the gas for its interstate busi-
ness. It is allowed to pay as operating expenses an unregu-
lated contract price for its co-owner's share and a different
unregulated contract price for the royalty owner's share, but
for its own share it is allowed substantially less than either.
Any method of rate-making by which an identical product
from a single well, going to the same customers, has three
prices depending on who owns it does not make sense to me.24
The old-gas pricing policy never did make sense. The FPC even tried
to discard it on occasion25 but the Commission was unable to reprice
cheap gas by ending what was termed "vintaging".26 Congress incor-
porated this FPC policy27 directly into the price structure of the
22. Id at 797. See also Note, note 4 supra at 112 n.70.
23. 390 U.S. 747, 836 (1968).
24. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581, 610 (1945) (concurring opinion).
25. See Just and Reasonable National Rates for Sales of Natural Gas, 51 F.P.C. 2212, 2218
(1974); Appalachian and Illinois Basin Area Rates, 48 F.P.C. 1299, 1310 (1972).
26. In Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 491 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1974), the court defines "vintaging":
Vintaging by contract is the practice of pricing gas according to the date when the
contract for its production was signed. Area rate orders have used contract vintaging in
establishing a two-tiered rate structure. All gas produced under contracts signed before a
certain date is pegged at one price, while the gas produced under later contracts gets a
higher price. Theoretically the bifurcated pricing system encourages exploration and
new production by granting a higher price for "new" gas.
Id at 34 n.5.




Pannill: Reform of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1981
NATURAL GAS POLICY ACT
Natural Gas Policy Act.2"
Yet the vintages have grown sour. The actual FPC rates estab-
lished in the 1970's have almost no relevance to today's market price.
For example, the base price of "flowing gas" sold under contracts dated
before January 1, 1973, was set at 33.2 cents per Mcf when the Act took
effect on December 1, 1978.29 Application of the inflation adjustment
increased this price to 41.8 cents by July, 1981,30 but this ceiling price
was only one sixteenth of the deregulated gas prices reported in 1980,
when prices as high as $7 per million Btu have been listed in FERC
filings. The equivalent price for crude oil would be about $2.45 per
barrel.3 '
Whether gas can be produced above operating costs at such prices
is not the real issue. To sell gas at a tiny fraction of the replacement
value wastes a national resource. In fact, statutory policy grants a
windfall to the consumer of "old" gas, who can buy a thousand cubic
feet of irreplaceable fuel for the cost of, say, a telephone call. For no
particular reason, the statute ratifies without change a questionable
FPC policy that labels all gas discovered in the past "old" gas and as-
sumes that the gas should be sold cheaply.
All that is old about this gas is the date of the sales contract. Yet
the contracts may not be altered to improve the price until they expire
by their own terms.32 Until the 1970's, natural gas was typically sold
under contracts of twenty years duration. Some gas contracts even ex-
tended for the life of the leases. Thus under the statute, gas first sold in
1972 might continue to be sold at a tiny fraction of its real value until
1992 or later.
Only when contracts for "old" gas expire may the sales qualify
under a so-called "rollover contract" for a higher price.33 A rollover
contract is one executed after the full term of the first contract has ex-
pired. Yet even these contracts price gas far below replacement value.
28. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301(3), (9), (10), (11) (Supp. III 1979).
29. 18 C.F.R. § 271.101(a), Table 11 (1981). A "small producer" price for flowing gas estab-
lished under FPC rate orders is somewhat higher, i.e., 49.1 cents per MMBtu for July, 1981.
30. E.g., Maximum Lawful Prices Under the Natural Gas Policy Act for August, September,
and October, 1981,46 Fed. Reg. 38,910 (1981) (to be codified in 18 C.F.R. § 271.101(a)). Contract
prices as high as $9.50 have been reported to the author.
3 1. A barrel of crude oil contains about six times the heating equivalent of a thousand cubic
feet of natural gas, or 6 MMBtu. Thus, a $7.00 gas price would be comparable to an oil price of
$42.00 a barrel.
32. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
33. See note 45 infra and accompanying text.
1981]
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For example, the rollover price for gas sold by large producers was set
at 60.3 cents per million Btu in December 1978 and has been increased
for inflation to 78.8 cents in 1981. 34 The comparable current price for
crude oil would be $4.50 a barrel.35 Likewise, the Commission set a
minimum price for gas some years ago to prevent underpricing. The
minimum price in 1981 was 26.5 cents per million Btu. The equivalent
oil price would be only $1.53 a barrel for oil.
As Mr. Justice Jackson warned, this "rate" policy borders on ab-
surdity.3 6 An effective policy would remove not only these backward-
looking prices but also the disparity between gas discovered before and
after a arbitrary date. Natural gas is a depleting resource and prices
must reflect a value based on replacement cost. If Congress wishes to
manipulate the price, the regulated price should be set not on a rate-
base theory but by estimating what price will be required to conserve
and replace the resource.
B. Intrastate Contracts
In passing the NGPA, Congress exercised power under the com-
merce clause 37 to freeze existing intrastate contracts until 1985.38 This
action extends the commerce power to its very limits. In setting prices
under existing intrastate gas contracts, Congress regulated commerce
that is not interstate. Moreover, many existing contracts cannot affect
interstate commerce because they expire after the price freeze. The os-
tensible purpose in regulating intrastate sales was to create a single na-
tional market for natural gas. But since existing intrastate sales are
regulated more oppressively than interstate sales by a complete price-
freeze,39 the real purpose may have been to direct gas into interstate
commerce. The constitutionality of this dubious provision has been at-
tacked but upheld. 0
Section 105 of the Act freezes existing intrastate contracts as they
stood on November 8, 1978, the day before the President signed the
legislation. In so doing, Congress fixed intrastate prices at the levels
34. 18 C.F.R. § 271.101(a), Table I (1981).
35. See note 30 supra.
36. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
38. 15 U.S.C. § 3315 (Supp. III 1979).
39. Id
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they had attained during the gas shortage of the 1970's. If the intrastate
contract contained nothing like a favored-nations clause, 41 which al-
lows the contract price to be redetermined to match other prices in the
field, then under section 105(b) the price under the contract is fixed at
1978 levels.42 The rapid inflation of 1979 and 1980 has caused these
frozen prices to drop in real terms.
Section 105 discriminates against intrastate sellers. All categories
of old interstate gas, and indeed all other prices under the statute, in-
crease with inflation. There is no reason to freeze intrastate contract
prices. An inflation adjustment means only that a price is indexed to
the changing value of the dollar and thus is frozen in real terms.
Therefore, intrastate prices, which are not indexed, are falling since a
1981 dollar will not buy what a 1978 dollar bought. This discrimina-
tion against intrastate sellers lacks a sound economic foundation.
Moreover, it was arbitrary of Congress to distinguish in law between
contracts that contained favored-nations clauses on the date of enact-
ment and those that did not. If the seller needs to increase his price
within the congressional ceilings, the buyer can usually be relied on to
ensure that the change is economically necessary.43
A sensible policy does not create arbitrary rules that may have
harsh results. Section 105 should allow free amendment of intrastate
contracts up to any general price ceiling. Whether a higher price is
warranted for a particular intrastate sale should be decided by the
market.
C. Rollover Contracts
Perhaps the most arbitrary exercise of congressional power ap-
pears in section 106 of the Act, which allows higher prices for "rol-
41. See 4 H. WILLIAMS & C. MYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 726 (1980):
1. A two-party favored nations clause provides that the price to be paid Seller by Buyer
will be increased to match any higher price contracted to be paid by the same Buyer to
any other seller in the same field or area.
2. A third-party favored nations clause requires the Buyer to meet any higher price
contracted to be paid by any other buyer in the same field or area. This clause is essen-
tially similar to the two-party favored nations clause except for the fact that a price
increase may be triggered by any other buyer in the same field or area in the former case
and only by the Buyer himself in the case of the two-party favored nations clause.
Where a contract contains a favored nations clause, § 105(b)(3) applies. 15 U.S.C. § 3315(b)(3)
(Supp. III 1979). For an interpretation of the favored nations clause within the statutory provi-
sion, see Superior Oil Co. v. Western Slope Gas Co., 604 F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1979); Seventh
Annual Tenth Circuit Survey-Lands and Natural Resources, 58 DEN. L.J. 415 (1981).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 3315(b) (Supp. II 1979).
43. See Breyer & MacAvoy, note 7 supra.
19811
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lover" contracts.' The statute defines a rollover contract as a new
contract covering "old" interstate and intrastate gas when the original
contract expires.45
First, section 106 imposes lower prices on interstate than on intra-
state rollover contracts, which hardly fits the theory of a unified na-
tional market.4 6 Second, Congress impliedly provided for significantly
lower prices in section 106(b)(2) for intrastate gas sold by private per-
sons than for intrastate gas sold by a state government or an Indian
tribe. A state or Indian tribe may sell under an intrastate rollover con-
tract at the ceiling set by section 102 for "new" gas. 47 For July, 1981,
FERC had set this price at $2.84 per million Btu." By comparison,
interstate rollover gas sells at the "just and reasonable" rate, which
could vary from 75.8 cents to $2.05 per million Btu. Intrastate rollover
gas sells at the price set in the last month of the original contract, with a
44. 15 U.S.C. § 3316 (Supp. III 1979).
45. The term "rollover contract" means any contract entered into on or after November
9, 1978, for the first sale of natural gas that was previously subject to an existing contract
which expired at the end of a fixed term (not including any extension thereof taking
effect on or after November 9, 1978) specified by the provisions of such existing contract,
as such contract was in effect on November 9, 1978, whether or not there is an identity of
parties or terms with those of such existing contract.
Id § 3301(12).
46. Compare id § 3316(a) with id § 3316(b).
47. Section 106(b)(2)(A) of the NGPA provides:
In the case of any first sale under any rollover contract of natural gas which was not
committed or dedicated to interstate commerce on November 8, 1978, and which consti-
tutes a State government's or Indian tribe's natural gas production, or royalty share or
other interest (as of such day) in natural gas production, from real property (including
subsurface mineral interests) owned on November 9, 1978, by such State government or
Indian tribe (as the case may be), the maximum lawful price under this subsection for
any such natural gas production, from real property (including subsurface mineral inter-
ests) owned on November 9, 1978, by such State government or Indian tribe (as the case
may be), the maximum lawful price under this subsection for any such natural gas deliv-
ered during any month shall be the maximum lawful price per million Btu's, computed
for such month under section (102) of this title (relating to new natural gas).
15 U.S.C. § 3316(b)(2)(A) (Supp. III 1979).
Under the § 102 ceiling price for new natural gas, the maximum lawful price is
(1) $1.75 per million Btu's, in the case of April, 1977; and
(2) in the case of any month thereafter, the maximum lawful price, per million Btu's,
prescribed under this subsection for the preceding month multiplied by the monthly
equivalent of a factor equal to the sum of-
(A) the annual inflation adjustment factor applicable for such month; plus
(B) (i) .035 in the case of any month beginning before April 20, 1981 or
(ii) .04, in the case of any month beginning after April 20, 1981.
Id § 3312(b). New natural gas is defined as gas to be produced from a new lease on the Outer
Continental Shelf, id § 3312(c)(1)(A); or, gas produced from new onshore wells, Id; or, gas pro-
duced from onshore reservoirs from which gas was not produced in commercial quantities before
April 20, 1977. Id § 3312(c)(1)(C).
48. 46 Fed. Reg. 24,174 (1981) (to be codified in 18 C.F.R. § 271.101).
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floor of one dollar per million Btu.49
If the reason for this discrimination is that state and Indian gas
revenues go for public purposes and not private profit, why place any
ceiling on these sales at all? The price ceiling shifts public revenues to
private consumers in the East and Midwest. Moreover, the higher pub-
lic ceiling has no economic rationale. States and Indian tribes, like
landowners, do not produce gas, they collect economic rents, which are
called royalties. If the ceiling set for producers will encourage enough
production to balance supply and demand, then the ceiling set for state
and Indian tribes may allow them a windfall, especially in view of their
unproductive role in gas production. If, on the other hand, Congress
set a proper ceiling for state and Indian royalties, the effect would be to
penalize producers from state lands by freezing prices.
D. New Gas
Congress created some "new-gas" prices that are even more arbi-
trary than those for old gas. "New-gas" prices, except for stripper
wells,50 were established to provide ceiling prices that offered drilling
49. The general rule under § 106(b) of the NGPA for intrastate rollover contracts provides
for alternative maximum lawful pricing:
(1) General Rule.-In the case of any first sale under any rollover contract of natural
gas which was not committed or dedicated to interstate commerce on the day before the
date of the enactment of this Act, the maximum lawful price under this subsection for
such natural gas delivered during any month shall be the higher of-
(A)(i) the maximum price paid under the expired contract, per million Btu's, in the
case of the month in which the effective date of such rollover contract occurs; and
(ii) in the case of any month thereafter, the maximum lawful price, per million
Btu's, prescribed under this subparagraph for the preceding month multiplied by the
monthly equivalent of the annual inflation adjustment factor applicable for such month;
or
(B)(i) $1.00 per million Btu's, in the case of April 1977; and
(ii) in the case of any month thereafter, the maximum lawful price, per million
Btu's, prescribed under this subparagraph for the preceding month multiplied by the
monthly equivalent of the annual inflation adjustment factor applicable for such month.
15 U.S.C. § 3316(b) (Supp. III 1979). An existing intrastate gas sales contract containing an esca-
lator clause could reach the higher § 102 price in the last month of the contract's term. The price,
however, would then be frozen and allowed to increase only with inflation. By contrast, the state
and Indian production pricing increases fully under § 102(b). This pricing scheme is debated in
note 48 supra.
50. The ceiling price for stripper well gas is set out in 15 U.S.C. § 3318 (Supp. III 1979).
Stripper well natural gas is defined as nonassociated natural gas which is produced any month
from a well if:
(A) during the preceding 90-day production period, such well produced nonassociated
natural gas at a rate which did not exceed an average of 60 Mcf per production day
during such period; and
(B) during such period such well produced at its maximum efficient rate of flow, deter-
mined in accordance with recognized conservation practices designed to maximize the
ultimate recovery of natural gas.
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incentives for the new national market. Congress did not use the rate-
base method but attempted to equate supply and demand. The results
are bewildering rather than delirious.5
E. New Natural Gas
The most important of the new statutory prices was to be that for
"new natural gas" under section 102.52 The price base Congress se-
lected for this category was $1.75 per million Btu, which it took to be
the average intrastate price for 1977.53 This is the highest price under
the Act for general categories of new gas and therefore is the main
incentive for new exploration and production of natural gas.
By 1981, the section 102 price had fallen behind the equivalent
price of crude oil. The section 102 level for July, 1981 of $2.84 equates
to an oil price of only $17 a barrel. More importantly, many new wells
do not qualify as new gas under section 102.54 In well determinations
reported to FERC in the first two years under the statute, new gas ac-
counted for thirty-eight percent of the volumes estimated under well
applications. About forty percent of the gas originated in offshore
Texas and Louisiana.5
The complex qualifying rules for section 102 have no particular
basis in either science or economics. Thus, a new onshore gas Well can
qualify for section 102 pricing only if it is 2.5 miles from an existing gas
well or completed in a producing reservoir one thousand feet deeper
than the completions of any existing well within 2.5 miles.5 6 This defi-
nition has no known basis in earth science. The distance selected was
an obvious compromise, since the Administration had proposed five
miles as the limit.
The rationale for the five mile limit was that producers had driven
prices up by withholding known reserves of gas from the market. Ad-
vocates of price control reasoned that the gas shortage could not have
Id § 3318(b)(1). "Nonassociated natural gas" is defined as that gas not produced in association
with crude oil. Id § 3318(b)(3)(C). Stripper well gas was granted a higher base of $2.09 per
million Btu's sold. Id § 3318(a)(1). Consequently, this must be considered a special-relief price
for old wells.
51. See FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 653 (1944) (Jackson, J., separate
opinion).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 3312 (Supp. III 1979). For the definition of new natural gas, see id § 3312(c).
53. Id § 3312(b)(1).
54. Seeid § 3312(d).
55. Foster Nat. Gas Rep. No. 1293, 13 (Dec. 31, 1980).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 3312(c)(l)(B) (Supp. Ill 1979).
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been caused by low FPC prices, since the federal courts had declared
them to be "just and reasonable".57 It was assumed that producers
must have deliberately withheld gas from the market. Therefore, a cir-
cle with a radius of first 5, then 2.5 miles was drawn to prevent produ-
cers from capitalizing on incentive prices for gas reserves held off the
market.
A dry hole can be drilled regardless of the number of producing
wells that surround the location. Even as previous drilling may
strongly suggest the presence of a gas reserve and reduce the risk, each
well is an investment decision. Price should provide an incentive to
takes risks in drilling new wells that will add to supply. By prohibiting
wells within a radius of 2.5 miles, the NGPA actually offers an incen-
tive to drill more dry holes, because it offers the best price for wells
drilled with the least geological information. In Texas, which produces
the largest volume of gas under the NGPA, only 1,790 new wells were
drilled in the first two years under the statute,58 compared with 6,555
development wells that could not qualify under section 102.19 No eco-
nomic justification can support pricing this production at lower rates
than "new-gas" production since both the risk of failure and the cost
vary. Congress has simply chosen to price some gas at cheaper rates.
Section 102 has provided some realistic incentive pricing by al-
lowing the new gas price to apply to new onshore reservoirs discovered
within the 2.5 mile radius.6" But this exception denies new reservoir
status if the reservoir was penetrated by an old well before April 20,
1977, and gas could have been produced in commercial quantities from
the old well.6' This rule shows the true congressional motivation,
which was to punish producers suspected of withholding gas. Produ-
cers should be encouraged to drill for any reserve that can produce
natural gas in commercial quantities. Few, if any, producers who fall
afoul of the withholding exemptions carried out deliberate withhold-
ing, and the only result of this provision has been to introduce an arbi-
trary and unnecessary distinction among wells.
57. FPC v. Texaco, 417 U.S. 380, 395 (1974); see FPC v. Texaco, 377 U.S. 33 (1964).
58. Foster, supra note 55, at 15.
59. Id
60. 15 U.S.C. § 3312(c)(1)(C) (Supp. III 1979).
61. Id § 3312(c)(1)(C)(i).
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F. New, Onshore Production Wells
As explained above, most new wells drilled since 1977 qualified
only as "new, onshore production wells."62 FERC issued 21,483 well
determinations under section 103 in the first two years under the stat-
ute, and only 5,979 under section 102.63 Section 103 was ostensibly
intended to set a price for development wells, with exploratory wells
covered by section 102. It is not explained in the statute or the Confer-
ence Committee why development wells should qualify for a lower
price. If the only justification for this category of sales were to punish
gas withholding, section 103 should be written out of the statute. It
makes no more sense to price gas by vintages64 based on geography
than vintages based on drilling date. The policy of Congress should be
to set a price that will promote production. Distinctions without eco-
nomic function ought to be abandoned.
To show how damaging the production well category has been,
consider the price of $1.75 per Mcf provided for these wells.6 - This
price, indexed for inflation, has in reality been frozen in 1977 dollars;
unlike the new-well price, there is no provision for real increases. This
limits the number of future prospects that will be drilled to those profit-
able at $1.75 per million Btu in 1977 dollars. Thus, section 103 will
limit supply from new wells. For consumers who buy section 103 gas at
the equivalent of $14.85 a barrel of oil, Congress again has merely fur-
nished a cheap source of energy.
G. High-Cost Gas
Section 107 of the statute expressly deregulates wells completed
below fifteen thousand feet. 6 The drafters do not tell us why they
62. Section 103 of the NGPA deals with "new, onshore production wells" generally and de-
fines these as any new well, not located on the Outer Continental Shelf,
(I) the surface drilling of which began on or after February 19, 1977;
(2) which satisfies applicable Federal or State well-spacing requirements, if any; and
(3) which is not within a proration unit-
(A) which was in existence at the time the surface-drilling of such well began;
(B) which was applicable to the reservoir from which such natural gas is produced;
and
(C) which applied to a well (i) which produced natural gas in commercial quanti-
ties or (ii) the surface drilling of which was begun before February 19, 1977, and which
was thereafter capable of producing natural gas in commercial quantities.
Id § 3313(c).
63. Foster, supra note 55, at 15.
64. See notes 26 and 27 .supra and accompanying text.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 3313(b)(l)(A) (Supp. III 1979).
66. Id § 3317(a).
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chose this depth. This demarcation line would seem to be one in which
experience would illuminate agency discretion. Deep gas should not be
defined arbitrarily but by looking for the point at which drilling costs
and large discoveries create a different kind of gas well, like offshore
wells. That point might be twelve thousand or twenty thousand feet.
The administrative process should define the term "deep well"6 7 by de-
ciding at what depth producers take a quantum leap in risk so that a
market price cannot be predicted on past trends.
Congress gave FERC the power to define other categories of high-
cost gas. FERC has recognized "tight" gas, which is produced from
formations of low permeability that have low rates of production, as
high-cost gas.6" FERC has tied tight-gas prices to a multiple of the
section 103 price for new onshore production wells. 69 The Commission
reasoned that the tight-gas price should fall in line with the price of
imported gas from Canada and Mexico. The current price for tight gas
is 200 percent of the section 103 price, $3.50 per million Btu in 1977
dollars and $4.952 as of July, 1981.70 This price certainly encourages
tight-gas exploration. The question that the "high-cost" categories
raise is one of misallocation of resources. Why should producers be
encouraged to search for unusually difficult supplies when the same
price might produce far greater conventional supplies of gas? This
question is particularly apt in the case of deep gas. The price of der-
egulated deep gas has reached $7 to $9 per million Btu. Is this the right
incentive? The lower tight-gas incentive price may offer the wrong in-
centive by urging producers into impermeable sands. Section 107 at
least offers an example of the kind of regulatory discretion suggested by
Mr. Justice Jackson:
Far-sighted gas-rate regulation will concern itself with
the present and future, rather than with the past, as the rate-
67. The NGPA defines "high-cost natural gas" as that:
(1) produced from any well the surface drilling of which began on or after February 19,
1977, if such production is from a completion location which is located at a depth of
more than 15,000 feet;
(2) produced from geopressured brine;
(3) occluded natural gas produced from coal seams;
(4) produced from Devonian shale; and
(5) produced under such other conditions as the Commission determines to present
extraordinary risks or costs.
Id § 3317(c).
68. Id
69. This gas is priced based upon an "adjusted" price in July, 1981, of $2.476 per MMBtu for
§ 103 gas.
70. See [1981] 21 FED. POWER SERv. 5-289 (Dkt. No. RM79-76).
19811
16
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 17 [1981], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol17/iss1/3
TULSA LAW JO URNAL
base formula does. It will take account of conditions and
trends at the source of the supply being regulated. It will use
price as a tool to bring goods to market-to obtain for the
public service the needed amount of gas. Once a price is
reached that will do that, there is no legal or economic reason
to go higher; and any rate above one that will perform this
function is unwarranted. If the supply comes from a region
where there is such overproduction that owners are ready to
sell for less than a fair return on their investment, there is no
reason why the public should pay more. On the other hand, if
the supply is not too plentiful and the price is not a sufficient
incentive to exploit it and fails to bring forth the quantity
needed, the price is unwisely low, even if it does square per-
fectly with somebody's idea of return on a "rate base." The
problem, of course, is to know what price level will be ade-
quate to perform this economic function.7
The creation of tight-gas prices at least constitutes recognition that
some gas price-setting by FERC is flexible.
H. Other Pricing Provisions
The plan of the statute is that producers may collect any price for
which they qualify under any section of the statute.72 For the NGPA
prices of sections 102, 103, 107, and 108, a producer must show that
each well qualifies for an incentive price.73 For existing sales, the pro-
ducer must show that the sale falls within the categories of old FPC
prices or is subject to an existing intrastate contract.74 If he fits in none
of these categories, then the well price is based on the "other" gas price
of section 109.71 Congress set this price at $1.45 per million Btu, in-
dexed for inflation. 76 This price is hopelessly out-of-date, having been
set in 1975. A different basis ought to be found for setting this price,
perhaps patterned after section 107.
The Commission does have authority to raise most prices, except
those of existing intrastate contracts, 77 if the increase is "just and rea-
71. Colorado Interstate Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581, 612 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) (af-
firming FPC reduction of rates under NGA).
72. See [1981] 21 FED. POWER SERV. 5-289 (Dkt. No. RM79-76); 18 C.F.R. § 271.102(a)
(1980).
73. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3312, 3313, 3317, 3318 (Supp. III 1979).
74. Id §§ 3314-3316.
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sonable within the meaning of the Natural Gas Act".7 8 The term "just
and reasonable" refers to the doctrine of cost-based pricing,79 the rate-
base method that paralyzed FPC discretion to set prices on any but a
historical basis.80 The legal standard of "just and reasonable" pricing
has no place in a realistic regulatory scheme.8
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS
The Act delegates to the states the authority to conduct hearings to
grant well-pricing applications.82 Congress phrased this delegation to
allow federal use of state resources to administer federal programs. If
Congress can command a state to carry out federal programs, the state
is treated not as a sovereign but as an administrative province. FERC
has, therefore, taken the position that state production agencies merely
have authority to make determinations under the Act, as a matter of
federal-state cooperation. 3 In fact, the statutory language makes it
clear that the states can waive their authority only if FERC gives its
consent.84 This delegation to state agencies, with ultimate review in the
federal courts, has been held to be permissible under the judicial article
of the Constitution and the commerce clause. 85
For penalties, the drafters created draconian remedies. Each day
78. Id § 3319(b)(2)(B). But see id § 3311(b)(5) which stipulates that for gas qualifying under
more than one provision of the Act, the provision resulting in the highest price applies.
79. The Natural Gas Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1976), "introduced the use of cost-
based price ceilings. . . . [T]hese prices, designated as 'just and reasonable' under section 4(a) of
the NGA, were calculated in the traditional public utility method--the pipelines could recover
only their actual costs plus a reasonable rate of return and depreciation." Note, Legislative History
of the Natural Gas Policy Act: Title I, 59 TEx. L. REv. 101, 107 (1980).
80. See note 80 supra.
81. E.g., City of Chicago v. FPC, 385 F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. deniedsub nom., Public
Service Comm'n v. FPC, 390 U.S. 945 (1968).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 3411(c) (Supp. III 1979). "The Commission may delegate to any State
agency (with the consent of such agency) any of its functions with respect to sections 3315,
3316(b), and 3319(a)(1) and (3) of this title;" id § 3413(c)(1): "A Federal or State agency having
regulatory jurisdiction with respect to the production of natural gas is authorized to make determi-
nations referred to in subsection (a) of this section."
83. See Oklahoma v. FERC, 494 F. Supp. 636 (W.D. Okla. 1980), which challenged the
constitutionality of the NGPA's imposition of price controls on and regulation of wholly intrastate
gas. The Oklahoma, Louisiana, and Texas challenge to the NGPA as an invasion of state sover-
eignty and intergovernmental immunities, citing to National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976), was unsuccessful. 494 F. Supp. at 659.
84. 15 U.S.C. § 3413(c)(2)(B).
85. Oklahoma v. FERC, 494 F. Supp. 636, 656-59 (W.D. Okla. 1980) (upholding Congres-
sional authority to limit jurisdiction of suits involving federal law to federal courts, to delegate
certain adjudicatory and legislative duties to state administrative agencies, without imposing the
federal appellate process on a state agency determination), aft'd, 661 F.2d 832 (10th Cir. 1981).
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is deemed a separate violation for both civil and criminal purposes.86
The civil penalty consists of a fine of five thousand dollars a day for
violation of "any provision of this Act, or any provision of any rule or
order under this Act .. ,. 7 Natural gas sales last for years, and civil
penalties for violation of the thousands of FERC rules should be scaled
back. For example, a penalty of $36.5 million could accrue over twenty
years of contract violations.
Congress defined the term "knowing" for civil violations as actual
knowledge or "the constructive knowledge deemed to be possessed by a
reasonable individual who acts under similar circumstances".88 The
same definition is carried over into the criminal penalties provided by
the statute, except that two years imprisonment is added as an alterna-
tive to the imposition of a fine of five thousand dollars a day.89 Not
even lawyers or accountants could have complete constructive knowl-
edge of this opaquely written set of price rules, and Congress should
dispense with the constructive violation.
The statute also lacks limitation provisions for some civil viola-
tions. While section 504(b)(6)(D) of the Act stipulates a limitations pe-
riod of three years, it also provides that the limitations period never
runs if the violator has made any untrue statement or omission of mate-
rial fact.90 The filing requirements of the Commission have become so
complex that this provision opens the way to staggering penalties over
many years without an effective statute of limitations. A traditional
approach to limitations should be reinstated.
V. DEREGULATION PROVISIONS
The NGPA was styled by Congress as a deregulation measure that
imposed only temporary price ceilings. But in fact, the statute only
deregulates limited classes of sales beginning in 1985. 91 Old gas, for
example, will be left under permanent regulation, perpetuating the low
prices and errors of the Natural Gas Act for decades. By deregulating
some gas and not other gas, the statute continues to subsidize the con-
sumer with cheap fuel.
86. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3414(b)(6)(C) & (c)(4) (Supp. III 1979).
87. Id § 3414(b)(6)(A)(i).
88. Id § 3414(b)(6)(B).
89. Id §§ 3414(c)(1)(A)-(C).
90. Id § 3414(b)(6)(D).
91. Id § 3331.
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Section 121 eliminates price controls for new natural gas qualify-
ing under section 102, most categories of high-cost gas sold under sec-
tion 107, and gas subject to existing intrastate contracts if the contract
price exceeds one dollar per million Btu on the last day of 1984.92 The
question remains that if Congress used power over intrastate commerce
only as an emergency measure why should any intrastate commerce be
permanently regulated?
Other gas is deregulated haphazardly. Gas from new onshore pro-
duction wells is deregulated only if the gas was not committed or dedi-
cated to interstate commerce on April 20, 1977.91 Gas from different
depths bears different deregulation dates.94 All gas subject to section
104 (existing interstate sales), section 108 (stripper wells) and section
109 (other gas) falls under the permanent and inadequate price ceilings
imposed by Congress. Most of the prices look back to April, 1977, or
before. There can be no economic justification for such distinctions.
Deregulation should be complete and not exclude some sales
arbitrarily.
Since most wells will have been qualified under section 103, the
definition of the phrase "committed or dedicated to interstate com-
merce"95 becomes crucial. Under the Natural Gas Act, much acreage
was "committed" to interstate contracts even though this acreage was
not productive. As the gas shortage deepened, the FPC took the posi-
tion that this gas was "dedicated" because of service rendered by means
of facilities of interstate commerce9 6 under the jurisdiction of the FPC.
The FPC asserted jurisdiction over acreage dedicated to interstate con-
tracts claiming that all production from the acreage had to be sold to
interstate pipelines subject to FPC price ceilings. Any acreage ever
subject to an interstate contract was thus impressed with the equivalent
of an interstate servitude.
The Supreme Court upheld the FPC's jurisdiction in California v.
Southland Royalty Co. 97 by holding that a lessee could dedicate acreage
in perpetuity by making a jurisdictional "sale" in interstate commerce
even though the landowner had never formally acquiesced in the corn-
92. Id
93. Id § 3331(a)(2).
94. Id §§ 3331(a) and (c).
95. Eg., id §§ 3301(18).
96. Id § 3314.
97. 436 U.S. 519, 525-28 (1978). See also Amerex, Inc. v. FERC, 603 F.2d 127 (10th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1102 (1980).
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mitment. This decision brought millions of undrilled acres under per-
petual FPC jurisdiction. This doctrine would subject unwitting sellers
to federal price ceilings years or even decades after an unregulated sale
took place. 98
In the NGPA, Congress attempted to relieve producers of the un-
certainty of the Southland Royalty decision by providing that where a
lease had expired and reverted to the landowner by May 30, 1978, the
gas would not be considered "committed or dedicated" to interstate
commerce under certain conditions.99 FERC has taken the position
that gas sold before the Act took effect fell under FERC jurisdiction
and subjected the sellers to paybacks or other penalties.100 This posi-
tion appears unsound in light of the Conference Committee's
statement:
Natural gas not committed or dedicated to interstate com-
merce as of the day before the date of the enactment of this
Act is never made subject to the Commission's jurisdiction
under Sec. l(b) of the Natural Gas Act.'0'
Nonetheless, the FERC position has been upheld by a recent decision
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 0 2 If
FERC asserts its position after deregulation in 1985, then hundreds of
wells qualified under section 103 will be perpetually regulated because
section 103 gas is only deregulated if it was "not committed or dedi-
cated to interstate commerce on April 20, 1977".103 Thus price controls
may continue for section 103 wells based on whether they were drilled
on dedicated acreage, a consideration without economic significance.
The doctrine of dedication should be repealed entirely.
This "deregulation" statute leaves unclear what gas is deregulated;
economic efficiency will be best served by deregulating all gas.
VI. CONCLUSION
The deregulation provisions, like the rest of the statute, represent a
political compromise. Economic efficiency and even lower prices will
be best achieved by deregulating all gas. "Such considerations may be
98. 436 U.S. at 531-46 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 3301(18)(B)(IV)(iii) (Supp. II 1979).
100. See Conoco, Inc. v. FERC, 622 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1980).
101. H.R. REP. No. 1752, (5th Cong.), 2d Sess. 123, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONa. &
AD. NEws, 8983, 9039-40. See also Conoco, Inc. v. FERC, 622 F.2d 796, 799 (5th Cir. 1980).
102. Falcon Petroleum v. FERC, 642 F.2d 780, 784 (5th Cir. 1981).
103. 15 U.S.C. § 3331(a)(2)(A) (Supp. III 1979).
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relevant to rate-base theories, but will not be very satisfying to a com-
ing generation that will look back and judge our present regulatory
method in the light of an exhausted and largely wasted gas supply."
10 4
It is time for Congress to rise above expediency.
104. Colorado Interstate Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581, 615 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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